Distraction; or, The Public Value of Literary Study by Urgo, Joseph R.
Journal X 
Volume 2 
Number 2 Spring 1998 Article 7 
2020 
Distraction; or, The Public Value of Literary Study 
Joseph R. Urgo 
Bryant College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx 
 Part of the Critical and Cultural Studies Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Urgo, Joseph R. (2020) "Distraction; or, The Public Value of Literary Study," Journal X: Vol. 2 : No. 2 , Article 
7. 
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/jx/vol2/iss2/7 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the English at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion 
in Journal X by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu. 
Distraction;
or, The Public Value of Literary Study
Joseph R. Urgo
Joseph R. Urgo is
 
Chair of the 'Depart
­ment of
 
English and  
Humanities at
 Bryant College in
 Smithfield, RI. He is
 the author of Faulk
­ner’s Apocrypha: A
 Fable, Snopes, and
 The Spirit of
 Human Rebellion,
 Novel Frames:
 Race, Sex, and His
­tory in American
 Culture, and Willa
 Cather and the
 Myth of American
 Migration, as well 
as essays on American
 literature and culture.
Pleasures lie on the other side of attentiveness. The
 
physical act of reading, the focus, the posture, and the
 suspension may at times approach levels of pain,
 although this discomfort, usually no more than the
 awkwardness of elbows in the
 
dark, is  fleeting. What  
a text solicits is not attention, but distraction. The
 text provides leave, it asks that you walk alone, and
 accuse the world that
 
possesses you, including your  
own cognitive resources, of insufficiency. After all,
 with the page in hand, you are looking
 
for something,  
listening for it. If the reading fails, if distraction is
 not rewarded with even the slightest increase in the
 capacity to endure the world that commands atten
­tion, you will retaliate, and someone will suffer
 
for it.
In 1936, Willa Cather wrote a letter to The Common
­
weal defending the function of
 
writing and reading  
literary texts. The letter is included in the volume,
 Willa Cather on Writing, with a 1930s left-baiting
 title, “Escapism.” Cather's central argument 
is
 that to  
accuse art and literature of being escapist 
is
 to engage  
in tautological thinking. “What has art ever been but
 escape?”, Cather asks, and what possible purpose can
 literature otherwise serve?
Nearly all the Escapists in the long past have
 
managed their own budget and their social rela
­tions 
so
 unsuccessfully that I wouldn’t want them  
for my landlords, or my bankers, or my neigh
­bors. They were valuable, like powerful stimu
­lants, only when they were left out of the social
1
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and industrial routine which goes on every day all over the world. Indus
­
trial life has to work out its own problems. (21)
Literary criticism in the twentieth century has been engaged in a quest for rel
­
evance that invites failure and brings displeasure and aggravation to its practi
­tioners. Deans and accreditation boards want to know about outcomes. Career
 planners want to know about options for undergraduate majors. Meanwhile,
 the ambitious graduate student 
is
 at work to prove that the past ten years of  
criticism on My Ántonia is false or windy and the true interpretation 
is
 at hand  
— his hand. Or the even more ambitious assistant professor is set to establish
 how
 
the intricate puzzle of gender relations in her culture is exposed in the text,  
which she explicates. The quest for relevance in literary studies has resulted in
 a succession of theoretical approaches, arguing everything from all the world’s
 a text (and thus the province of formalist literary scholarship) to all the world's
 social ills exist in some particular text, or canon, or tradition. Meanwhile, the
 function of literary criticism within the structured performances of public
 thinking has eroded steadily, and the only voices that are certain to reach the
 public at large are those that attack the institution and the practice of literary
 scholarship.
Willa Cather's letter to The Commonweal addresses the question that every
 
generation of literary scholars must answer: Why study literature? The implic
­it answer in recent decades has been anything but Cather
'
s invitation to escape.  
Cather opens her letter with an account of primitive Southwest Native Amer
­ican women, living “under the perpetual threat of drought and famine,” who
 nonetheless invest hours of effort to paint geometrical patterns on their earth
­enware jars and pots even “when they had nothing to cook in them.” The urge
 to make the world aesthetically pleasing, according to Cather, springs from “an
 unaccountable predilection” of human behavior (19). Nonetheless, the question
 of the usefulness of such activities dogs us, especially in United States civiliza
­tion, where our attention is turned so persistently to productivity. Here is
 where Cather takes a less than genteel turn. All true poets are “useful,” she
 argues,
 
“because they refresh and recharge the spirit of those  who can read their  
language” (20). Cather retreats quickly from the second point, referring instead
 to the “powerful stimulants” in literature and defending literature against calls
 for immediate social relevance. The point she does not pursue is her assertion
 that whatever escape literary artists provide, they do so only for those who can
 read their language.
The women who painted intricate patterns on pots and jars saw past the
 
practical utility of these items to something more — not necessarily more pro
­found, but certainly less immediate. At the very least, the etched shapes reflect
 a power of cognition that refuses to limit itself to water-carrying, that by its
 artistic endeavor asserts that the limits of its attention are not met merely by
 toting water up the hill and toting human waste back down. The basis for read
­ing the language of
 
arts is to recognize how their attention has been focused,  
and then to read past representation to the cognitive quality
 
of the impulse that  
produced it. The inability to read their language produces charges of irrele
­vance and uselessness because such readings read the text but cannot read past
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it. Likewise, the insistence upon reading the language of art as if it were lim
­
ited to its representational or performative functions leads to successive, dis
­posable interpretive gestures, resulting in higher-level charges of irrelevance
 and uselessness. It is as if to say, how nice that those Pueblo Indians decorat
­ed their pots, they must have had plenty of leisure time to make such pretty
 shapes.
In Moby Dick, Melville invites the process of reading past on a number of
 
occasions, extracting from everyday whaling operations richly evocative con
­tent. The narrative itself reads past the business of whaling to a succession of
 complexities embodied in the purposeful actions of sailors. In the following
 passage, Melville describes the whale line, tied to the harpoon:
Again: as the profound calm which only apparently precedes and prophe
­
sies of the storm, 
is
 perhaps more awful than the storm itself; for, indeed,  
the calm 
is
 but the wrapper and envelope of the storm; and contains it in  
itself, as the seemingly harmless rifle holds the fatal powder, and the ball,
 and the explosion; so the graceful repose of
 
the line, as it silently serpen ­
tines about the oarsmen before being brought into actual play — this is a
 thing which carries more of true error than any other aspect of this dan
­gerous affair. But why say more? All men live enveloped in whale lines.
 All are born with halters round their necks; but it is only when caught in
 the swift, sudden turn of death, that mortals realize the silent, subtle, ever
­present perils of life. And if you be a philosopher, though seated in the
 whale-boat, you would not at heart feel one whit of terror, than though
 seated before your evening fire with a poker, and not a harpoon, by your
 side. (306)
The useful whale line 
is
 explained metaphorically, as it shares the qualities of  
the quiet that precedes a storm, or of the unheld, loaded weapon — harmless
 and calm until its potential function commences. These images are enough to
 know the whale line, and to appreciate its utility and its purpose in the narra
­tive. But to read past the whale line 
is
 to recognize the thought processes con ­
tained within those metaphors. If all men live enveloped in whale lines, living
 day to day might be understood as the storm's calm prologue, or the uncocked
 weapon, so that we might offer the interpretation that grace, dignity, and even
 the larger structures of civilization simply give form to human illusions of per
­manence. Here, with Melville s language, we begin to read past his image, but
 not quite. We are still at the level of the image of the whale line and its applic
­ability to human nature, still thus at the symbolic function.
The last line of the passage invites the process of reading past its interpre
­
tive possibilities. One does not need to sit in a whaleboat and hold 
a
 harpoon  
to attend to the terror of the image created by the whale line. If you are philo
­sophical, if you can read their language, then “seated before your evening fire
 with a poker, and not 
a
 harpoon, by your side,” you will gain access to the cog ­
nitive horrors tapped by the coiled whale line. The gesture of poking the fire
 thus emerges as an attenuation of the harpoon thrust (as well as a hundred
 other such outward gestures), and the safety of the domestic hearth a delusion
3
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equal to Ahabs ambition of control over natural forces. Linked this way to the
 
Pequod's mission, fire poking becomes a task worthy of pleasured distraction,
 like toting water in decorated pots. The material circumstances of an action
 obscure but do not change the precarious nature of the chain of circumstances
 to which it ultimately contributes. To read past the whale line 
is
 to read past  
whaling as a whole toward the cognitive processes that led Melville
'
s imagina ­
tion to be filled so deeply with harpoons, vessels, and madmen.
In Moby Dick, Melville consistently documents and reads past the utilities
 
of whaling, and the whale line passage 
is
 exemplary, not exceptional. Nonethe ­
less, to read past Melville is to contemplate the turn of his attention to whaling
 in order to capture images sufficient to the imaginative direction of the text. To
 read past the juxtaposition of harpoon and fireplace poker, for example, might
 lead one to recognize subsequent correspondences between images in the text
 and gestures contained within the reader’s own daily performances. Thus, the
 existence of Ahab’s quest for the great white
 
whale exists over the facts of whal ­
ing like those geometrical patterns on earthenware pots. The women need
 those pots,
 
but they don’t need the geometrical designs except as an escape from  
the needed pots. Ahab and the crew of the Pequod need whales, but they don’t
 need Moby Dick except as an expression of their need to transcend or escape
 the business of whaling. The limits of this crew’s attention are not met, in other
 words, merely by killing whales. If one’s sense of the now 
is
 expansive, it con ­
tains room in it for the day-to-day functions of whaling and pot-toting, and
 also for great white whales and geometrical figurations. Throughout the text,
 Melville probes the unaccountable predilection of human beings to project the
 forms and structures of their thoughts on wider canvases than circumstances
 provide, to become creatively, and at times destructively, inattentive to the prac
­tical content of their thoughts and the tasks at hand. The continuous move
­ment
 
by Pueblo Indian women, up and down the cliffs, from their rock-perched  
homes to sources of
 
water far below, most surely influenced the geometrical  
patterns of their aesthetic impulses, reified on their pot burdens. The continu
­ous movement by New England whalers, further and further out to sea, to
 destroy life for commerce and for illumination, worked on Melville’s mind 
so that every operation, from signing on to the ship to harpooning the whale,
 became invested with a significance to those who could read its language. Plea
­sure arises from the discovery that through inattention labor may come to pos
­sess value, even significance, far beyond our capacity to comprehend fully each
 gesture, each toting. In every case, the literary emerges from these forms and
 structures of distraction, and it is in this mode of cognition that literary critics
 find their vocation.
Distraction is serious business in literature. At its very best, the literary 
is 
the art of reading past. It 
is
 not the study of history, or the study of social con ­
ditions, or the study of any particular representation of reality but the study of
 how one reads past every one of these phenomena. Reading past means over
­passing the mimetic detail — a whaling venture, a pattern of conflict, a social
 issue — to a consideration of the particular representation as imaginative stim
­ulus within the larger system of meaning created by the work. And even then,
 it is not the system of meaning that one settles on but the creation of meaning,
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the action, or movement of the system towards expansive meaning. One reads
 
literature to be present at the creation, and then to move past what has been
 created toward the something more that informs, in essence, the literary. Those,
 who cannot read the language of literary texts, or whose minds are satisfied
 with lesser works, or who prefer the seemingly less mediated language of histo
­ry or social science, may not be comfortable or find use in reading past but read,
 rather, for the mimetic or informational quality of the text. This 
is
 under ­
standable, as we seem to lack an articulate rationale for the study of literary
 writing, and much of what passes as literary criticism 
is
 really history, sociolo ­
gy, or cultural commentary.
Reading precedes comprehension, interpretation, and criticism. The ques
­
tion of how one reads is not a simple one, and its complexity has become
 increasingly apparent as reading habits shift at the end of this century and as
 literary criticism loses its public relevance. Charles Altieri thus proposes “that
 we shift our attention from the relations between interpretive statements and
 their objects to the positions that works of art make available for reflecting on
 ourselves as interpreting subjects” (291-2). Altieri proposes a move away from
 concern with the constellation of interpretive paradigms surrounding literary
 texts and toward greater attention to textually-based extensions of the readers
 own imaginative capacities — and then to construct a language and a means of
 explaining this process. “The problem for contemporary theory is to show how
 .. . imaginative activity can at once be assessed within a common language and
 have some influence on the principles adapted for those assessments” (16).
 Similarly, Michael Bérubé finds that “while we academic readers have been
 devising more and more exacting ways of reading our texts, our worlds and our
 critics, the reading skills and reasoning facilities of [even the college-educated
 mass public] have become cause for national alarm” (65). It may be that the
 ways in which academic readers read are ill communicated by the rituals of crit
­ical presentation and poorly represented within the discourse of college and
 university curricula. It is not likely, for example, that the demands of reading
 imaginative literature and the skills required to read an executive summary are
 properly or usefully conflated in assessing facility with language. John Guillo
­ry correctly dismisses the internecine battles within the literary establishment
 over canons and cores as a symptom of a much larger problem, a crisis shared
 by conservative and radical academics alike. Two distinct forms of “cultural
 capital” are pitted against each other in the processes of contemporary intellec
­tual formation, “one of which 
is
 ‘traditional,' the other organic to the constitu ­
tion of the professional-managerial class” (45). The literary establishment has
 not performed well in defending the place of traditional literary study (in any
 form, from Great Books to postcolonialism) within the context of the intellec
­tual demands of corporate capitalism. “It has proven to be much easier to quar
­rel about the content of the curriculum than to confront the implications of a
 fully emergent professional-managerial class which no longer requires the cul
­tural capital of the old bourgeoisie.” Nonetheless, Guillory's sense of "cultural
 capital” stresses the content over the active demands of imaginative literature.
 When academic readers become entrenched over issues of what to read, they
 sidestep and become mournfully inattentive to issues of how to read.
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“Through the fence, between the curling flower spaces, I could see them
 
hitting.” The sentence is the opening
 
line of Faulkner’s The Sound and the Fury.  
It makes little sense, literally, to talk about curling flower spaces or what lies
 between them. Explication can 
fix
 this problem, and maybe a drawing of a pair  
of curled flower stems, showing how the space bordered by the stems also curls
 (like one of those pictures of a lamp that turns out to be two profiles facing one
 another) will settle the issue once and for 
all.
 But after all that, we still have  
this confused sentence and the question: Why was it written this way? To
 demonstrate how perception can be deceiving, psychologists use the trick pic
­ture with the lamp and the twin profiles. Is Faulkner
'
s sentence meant to  
deceive? Unlike the profile/lamp, the sentence does not represent two images
 simultaneously. There is the fence, the curly spaces between the flowers, and
 the “I” who could see them hitting. More explication can help. The “I” is the
 voice of an idiot, the character Benjamin Compson, a retarded man whose per
­ceptions are thus discordant with conventional narrative methods. Of course,
 we would have to forewarn anyone who might think that Faulkner’s book is an
 accurate depiction of the consciousness of a retarded man. Such representation
 would be impossible, since only
 
the retarded man would be in a position to ver ­
ify the text and no one as retarded as Benjamin Compson can read The Sound
 and the Fury. This, then, returns us to the sentence, which, divested of mimet
­ic qualities and any test of credibility, remains senseless. We must read past the
 representational sense of the sentence toward something else.
With Faulkner, there 
is
 often the problem of making sense and the chal ­
lenge to read past this problem. Not everyone has seen it this way. Edmund
 Volpe, in A Reader’s Guide to William Faulkner, provided 
a
 number of charts,  
graphs, and genealogies to make sense of Faulkner
'
s texts. Volpe 's project has  
continued over the years, with guides, notes, interpretations, approaches, and
 book-length readings produced regularly to aid the uninitiated in making their
 way through the text.1 There are fifteen time shifts in Benjamin Compson
'
s 
narrative, and Volpe charts them. The implication is that once the reader mas
­ters the time shifts, the meaning of the text is clear. But this is not necessarily
 so. Knowing all the time shifts introduces an entirely new level of meaning to
 the text. To make schematic logic of Benjamin’s narrative is to establish a level
 of meaning that knows what the chapter, and the narrator, does not know: the
 schematic meaning of the text’s opening narrative. Clearly, even in an age when
 we do not talk about authorial intention, this text was meant to be confusing.
 If we eliminate the confusion by charting the time shifts, we are damaging the
 text no less than if we rewrote Dickens to make him more confusing: “Times
 the best it
 
was of, worst the times it was of.” Why would anyone do that? The  
revision doesn’t help clarify what happens when the text 
is
 read as written. The  
same is true of the curling flower spaces, where making sense, of the narrative
 destroys its effect and its meaning. Rather than making sense, the reader must
 read past.
Much of literary criticism proceeds in the same manner as Volpe’s famous
 
(and admittedly seductive) guidebook. The critic’s method 
is
 often “this means  
this” and “this says this but really means this” and “this 
is
 meaningless unless  
you know that and once you know that then this means this” or, ultimately, “this
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says this but really means this.” It 
is
 no wonder that the general readership for  
literary criticism — unlike that for history or the social sciences — has nearly
 disappeared. Who wants to be told what a book means? And worse, if you
 can’t know one book without reading another, why read either? “You don’t
 know about me,” announces the narrator on the first page of Mark Twain’s
 Adventures of Huckleberry Finn, “without you have read 
a
 book by the name of  
'The Adventures of Tom Sawyer,’ but that ain’t no matter.” It’s no matter
 because there is little about Huck Finn in the other book that is necessary to
 the experience of reading his emergence in the book he narrates. The self-
 defeating quality in much of literary criticism 
is
 that criticism is too often tied  
to explication — efforts to make the meaning plain are inevitably doomed to
 disposability because meaning changes with context, with readers’ sensibilities,
 and with shifting political, cultural, and social priorities. It is no wonder that
 the guidebooks keep coming, each decade making sense, again, of the tales told
 by idiots and artists. For literary studies to reassert its value in the present, it
 must get past, or read past, the meaning of texts.
To read
 
past — say, to read past a common literary theme, such as social tol ­
erance — is to experience a transformation of intellectual capacities so that the
 mimetic question, what
 
is this book about? is supplanted by the reactive, or com ­
pensatory, question, what is this book doing to me and my distracted sensibilities?
 There is no other question wholly appropriate and wholly exclusive to the lit
­erary. Consider the hypothetical example of a novel about social tolerance. To
 read past tolerance 
is
 to expiate a prior understanding — not merely to recog ­
nize one’s own thinking but to have one’s thinking suspended, distracted — 
so that the mind 
is
 cognizant of the parallel, or the literary equivalence, to the  
intellectual energies that tolerance necessitates. It may well be that a novel that
 depicts an intolerant man would be wholly beside the point. Our attention,
 then, might be more productively focused on “expressions of certain modes of
 intelligence, thought, and feeling” in the novel, expressions unavailable else
­where, in other discursive practices (Parker 38). David Parker thus directs the
 reader to attend to “the spirit, the ethos or character of a literary work’s creative
 thinking” and not to become snagged on its subject matter, its theme, or its
 mimetic qualities. What Parker is describing 
is
 a land of inattention, where one  
willfully attends not to what is literally depicted but to the cognitive energies
 and structures that produced or gave rise to the representation. This kind of
 thinking is not always polite because it is often mistaken for irrelevance or
 taken as a form of hostility toward pressing business. “Reading is a judgment,”
 according to Sven Birkirts. “It brands as insufficient the understandings and
 priorities that govern ordinary life” (85). Unless one holds that literary texts are
 simply decorative, or that the geometrical shapes serve no cognitive purpose
 either
 
in the drawing or  the repeated, daily viewing, one must confront seriously  
the mode of attention demanded by literary distraction. To enter into the world
 of the curling flower spaces, one must become inattentive to the world where
 such utterance would interfere with business or be disruptive, and .one must
 decide, for the time, that that ain’t no matter.
inattention n.
L17. [f. IN-3 + ATTENTION.]
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Failure to pay attention or take notice; heedlessness, negligence. L17.
 
Lack of courteous personal attention. L18.
The OED traces inattention to the late seventeenth century, when it signaled a
 
“failure to pay attention or take notice” and the resultant judgment of “heed
­lessness, negligence.” One hundred years later, the inattentive were judged
 more severely and held more specifically responsible for their actions, as the
 term since then has indicated “lack
 
of courteous personal attention.” Thus what  
starts as an observable human tendency (“failure to pay attention”) linked to
 irresponsibility (“negligence”), becomes, by the end of the eighteenth century, a
 form of misbehavior and a breach of etiquette 
as
 well (“lack of courteous per ­
sonal attention”). In the twentieth century, inattention has evolved into a diag
­nosable intellectual malfunction, marking its complete metamorphosis from
 tendency to pathology. Attention Deficit Disorder (ADD) 
is
 a psychological  
ailment commonly associated with childhood but also diagnosable in adults.
 Current research on the disorder, however, finds that far from indicating a
 deficit, the symptoms associated with ADD may signal an excess of attention.
 “The irony is that behavior interpreted as ‘thoughtless’ probably is a result of
 too much awareness and the desire to cope” (Cherkes-Julkowski et al. 6). The
 desire to conform to expectations and to cope with felt inadequacies produces
 behavioral irregularities, such as hyperactivity. Significantly, the person with
 ADD is more comfortable in an environment characterized by rapid shifts in
 stimuli and less comfortable in environments that call for sustained attention or
 the practice of repetitive tasks (9). The disorder may well be an advance indi
­cation of human adaptation to current trends in the social and intellectual envi
­ronment. As the volume of sensory stimuli increases, the mind must spend
 more and more of its energies prioritizing its attentive capacities.
The issue, of course, involves what one ought to attend to. The processes
 
of socialization and education involve directing ones attention in socially
 acceptable,
 
preferably productive ways. It is no coincidence that issues of atten ­
tiveness should fall within the provinces of medical science in the late twenti
­eth century; the environment produced by technology makes the phenomenon
 particularly problematic, and thus “inattention” joins drinking, drug use, and
 smoking as medical
 
illnesses, not rational  social choices. Anyone  who writes on  
a Windows-based word processing and personal computing system and feels
 the need to check e-mail periodically knows that communication technology
 works at cross-purposes to the art of sustained attention to single tasks. On the
 contrary, Windows technology specifically functions against focused attention
 and actively encourages a “multi-task” desktop ecology. The use of internet
 technology to foster reading skills also acts quite explicitly against sustained
 attention, as web sources are predicated on the fact that alternatives, or linked
 texts and images, are always one mouse-click away.2 These are not incidental
 matters. Indeed, forms of attention have been recognized for decades by com
­munication scholars to lie at the very core of civilization. “Attention^ structure
 is a way of understanding social organization in terms of the structure of the
 
sys ­
tem of communication, rather than solely in terms of the nature of the signal,
 its content and behavioural effects” (Chance and Larsen 2). Hence, the divi
­
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sion of attention within social groups 
is
 fundamental to the power structure and  
future development of the social order. For example, the way in which one
'
s 
attention is deployed may define one
'
s relationship to the larger group — inat ­
tention may indicate anything from lack of concern to hostility, but it may also
 signal a position of leisured power. Similarly, the function exercised by some
 agencies to direct our attention, such as the power of news corporations and
 television broadcasts to set the agenda of public concern, far exceeds the con
­tent of any particular message conveyed. Chance and Larsen conclude that
 “[b]ecause of the central role of attention in the control and coordination of
 social behaviour, it is probable that the social organization of attention has been
 a crucial
 
factor in human evolution?
How does a literary text direct our attention? Birkirts identifies the asocial
 nature of reading, where reading is understood as an implicit rejection of the
 demands of the social world — whether it be the pressures on children to go
 play outside because it is 
a
 nice day, or on adults to interact with others or  
engage in some productive activity, such as going to the office or mowing the
 lawn. Reading 
is
 like walking alone, in Emerson s terms: “Whoso goes to walk  
alone, accuses the
 
whole world; he declares all to be unfit to be his companions;  
it 
is
 very uncivil, nay, insulting; Society will retaliate” (100). Unlike a self ­
improvement book, 
a
 gardening manual, or a study of childhood development,  
the literary text 
is
 not read to prepare for more efficient, subsequent activity.  
Literary reading is more accurately understood as studied inattention, as it
 argues implicitly for a conception of the meaningful that may discount shared
 values of efficiency, including linear conceptions of time, the privileging of
 immediate, present concerns, and the injunction that one be accountable,
 always, in one
'
s activities. When one reads literature attentively, one loses time,  
is unaware of present concerns, and is unaccountable. It 
is
 no wonder that lit ­
erary employments — reading as well as writing — are seen as an affront to
 those with schedules to attend to, or to those who seek to maintain efficiency
 standards. Society will retaliate. One cannot claim to need to know about
 Benjy
'
s curling flower spaces, or Ishmael 's whale line, in order to do one 's busi ­
ness or attend to one
'
s obligations properly. However, it is more likely that one  
cannot make these claims credibly because literary critics have not articulated
 their validity.
Reading literature mirrors the kind of social rejection necessary to the cre
­
ation of imaginative fiction. When readers engage in the forms of distraction
 demanded by the text, they participate in a ritual of inattentiveness set into the
 fiction by its creator, its author. The twentieth century has not always proved
 so hospitable to literary distraction. On the eve of the century, Sarah Orne
 Jewett envisioned the quest for literary space as one that involved travel to the
 more remote regions of geographical consciousness. In The Country of the
 Pointed Firs (1896), a woman travels to Maine in order to find “all that mixture
 of remoteness, and childish certainty of being the centre of civilization” (5) that
 makes reading and writing possible. Hunting seclusion, she goes to Dunnet
 Landing to escape the social
 
world and find the privacy and certainty necessary  
to artistic creation. However, when she arrives she becomes enmeshed in the
 community through her landlady’s herb business and thus must struggle to cre
­ate space for inattention:
9
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To have been patted kindly on the shoulder and called “darlin’,” to have
 
been offered a surprise of early mushrooms for supper, to have had all the
 glory of making two dollars and twenty-seven cents in a single day, and
 then to renounce it all and withdraw from these pleasant successes, needed
 much resolution. Literary employments are so vexed with uncertainties at
 best, and it
 
was not until the voice of conscience sounded louder in my ears  
than the sea on the nearest pebble beach that I said unkind words of with
­drawal to Mrs. Todd. She only became more wistfully affectionate than
 ever in her expressions, and looked as disappointed as I expected when I
 frankly told her that I could no longer enjoy the pleasure of what
 




The act of committing oneself to literary employments is explicitly unkind: it
 
shows a willed lack of consideration for others and represents a breaking with
 the social rewards that come from attentiveness. Reading past the predicament
 of the writer in Jewett’s passage, past the entangling seductions of the immedi
­ate world (being someone’s darlin
'
, sharing supper, making $2.27), we find that  
literary employments are made possible by renunciation, withdrawal, and reso
­lution. Furthermore, these acts of unkindness and resolve are issued in order to
 gain entry into a world of certainty (although a certainty precariously vexed by
 uncertainty), and so naturally, it would seem, the recipients of these acts would
 misconstrue them and suffer the kind of disappointment experienced by the
 abandoned Mrs. Todd.




those forms of behavior produced by literary modes of thought. One  
cannot plead human nature here, which seems to be social. On the contrary,
 literary employments are located outside the natural inclinations of human
 beings and within the proclivities of conscious effort. Literary employments
 thus renounce natural connections, from the transcendent human identification
 with such natural forces as the sea to the sensual pleasures of being loved, cared
 for, and needed by someone else. To attend to the book, one must renounce the
 world at hand for the “uncivil” world of the distracted mind. The impulse
 places the imagination at the core of consciousness, 
as
 it was in childhood,  
before knowledge made its inroads and adult provisionality replaced the child’s
 sense of being securely centered. With creative energies at the core and not at
 the fringe, the imagination is temporarily restored to a position of conscious
 dominance while the book is read and contemplated. Freed from the recipro
­cal obligations of
 
sensual, interpersonal attentions, the imagination returns to  
its primary function, which is to provide the self with its pleasured sense of
 security and reality. When the “lover of Dunnet Landing returned to find the
 unchanged shores of the pointed firs,” she returns like a reader to a book, and
 discovers something constant about herself.
Still, the price of discovery is the act of unkindness that makes literary
 
employment possible. In Jewett’s novel, the narrator renounces her home in
 New York for Dunnet Landing, and then must renounce Dunnet Landing for
 a one-room schoolhouse, where she sets up her writing desk. The gradually
 more severe renunciation signals the obstacles that the twentieth century would
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place before literary employments, as “Dunnet Landing” would become
 
increasingly more difficult to locate on the psychic landscape. The need to pay
 attention — to broadcasts, motorists, and communication devices — exacts a
 continuously rising price on imaginative impulses and foreshortens the amount
 of time when the imagination rules consciousness. While childhood shrinks,
 adolescence is lengthened, and this protracted period of powerless attentiveness
 results in a range of anxieties, social disorders, and learning disabilities. Chron
­ic inattentiveness is tolerated in childhood only, although what it represents to
 the mind is necessary to all of us. Of course, reading is only one form, perhaps
 the most difficult and most encompassing form, of distraction. Television,
 magazines, sporting events, video games, the internet: these are all forms of
 distraction in which the imagination is only partially ascendant, where atten
­tion is divided but not obliterated, so as to allow the maintenance of social
 obligations. Nonetheless, the popularity of such forms of partial inattention
 indicates the limited satisfaction provided by continuously paying attention.
In a remarkable book devoted to the mysteries of attention, James Hans
 
explains the “psychic economy that depends on inattention”:
If we say that we need inattention because we require states of being that
 
take us away from the anxiety of living, we are conceding that the burdens
 of being a self-aware creature are too great for us to bear for any length of
 time. And if we see the ways that our desire for inattention has created a
 series of
 
social forms that are designed to take our minds off of  our anxi ­
eties, then we can see how the two coalesce to provide us with a life that
 inclines toward inattention rather than full awareness. (34)
The extraordinary burdens of self-awareness can be and are relieved in count
­
less ways, some of which are physically debilitating. Tremendous resources are
 expended on forms of attention — education, preparation, development of
 skills — but when it comes to inattention, most people are on their own or at
 the mercy of entertainment industries, drug dealers, and liquor stores. The fact
 is that educational institutions fail to attend systematically to modes of inat
­tention because, like Cather
'
s critics in the 1930s, they equate inattention with  
escapism, and escapism with irresponsibility. The cliff-dwelling women need
­ed to apply geometrical patterns to their earthenware just as, in Hans’s words,
 we need inattention because we concede “that the burdens of being a self-aware
 creature are too great for us to bear for any length of time.” And more than
 that: we concede that if we are to go on toting water up the hill we are going
 to have to get past the drudgery of attending to the task. We move with dis
­traction past our predicament and turn inattention into art — we require inat
­tention as a mode of survival. Distraction is more than a form of anxiety
 release; it 
is
 a crucial component of the solution to a psychic dilemma as old as  
human recording. “Why are we here?” 
is
 always, in part, answered by, “So we  
do not have to be here.” The relation between the two heres is the province of
 literature. Distraction, even coarse forms such as mass entertainment and alco
­hol, is never mindless; on the contrary, it is an escape from frittering mindless
­ness, 
a
 mindful compensation for the dullness that enforced attentiveness pro ­
duces, achieved through pleasured inattention to its sources and causes.
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The heedlessness and negligence of inattention, and the departure from
 
social modes of courteous attention represented by literary endeavors, provide
 the grounds upon which we may begin to defend what it 
is
 we mean by the  
value of literary study. Formalist criticism has long argued the capacity of lit
­erature to defamiliarize the real, to make it strange, as a preparation for renewed
 insight and greater understanding of reality. Social criticism values works of the
 imagination as lenses into the complexities of race and gender, historical forces
 and class structures. The two modes of analysis — formal and social — have
 been pitted against each other through most of the twentieth century, although
 both share a devotion to imaginative structures of knowledge. Distraction
 floats past all of these categories of analysis, like the student whose gaze directs
 his face outside, through the window in the schoolroom, although he 
is
 not  
looking at anything and nothing has his attention. It is the teacher, not the stu
­dent, who labels such inattentiveness discourtesy. Genuine inattention does not
 signify the absence of interest or even the presence of disinterest; rather, what
 we assign 
as
 inattention more likely signals an excessive intake, like sleeping  
scholars in midnight library carrels. To dismiss such actions as forms of negli
­gence is to burn the book, as it were, as an evil influence or inappropriate stim
­ulant. The literary tradition in all of its evocations and critical paradigms is, at
 base, the verbal manifestation of the human need for modes of distraction.
 Labeled “escapist” by those with authoritarian agendas, the need to pay atten
­tion where it yields the most pleasurable cognitive return is at the heart of the
 literary experience. Distraction 
is
 serious business, representing more than dis ­
courtesy. Our management experts, our social scientists of every stripe, would
 like the world to be a courteous and heedful place where rules govern human
 behavior — except for an occasional, structured retreat or brainstorming ses
­sion. But the world is influenced more by its record of inattention than by its
 commitment to any particular intellectual regime. According to the OED, dis
­traction signals a change in direction:
distraction n.
LME. [(O)Fr., or L distractio(n-), f. as DISTRACT v.: see-ION.]
Diversion of the mind, attention, etc., from a particular object or
 
course; the  
fact of having ones attention or concentration disturbed by something;
 amusement, relaxation. LME.
An instance or occasion of this; something that distracts or
 
diverts the mind  
or attention; distracting sounds, events, etc. E17.
The fact or condition of being physically or mentally drawn in different
 
directions by conflicting forces or emotions. 
L16.
The best of what we read — and here we come upon core issues of canon
 
formation — specifically addresses our attention-paying capacities. The realm
 of the imagination is contested space because all social reality
 
flows from it, and  
all social potentiality depends upon it. Unless one considers the world a par
­adise and desires no changes, all distraction, including literary representation,
 will be of signal importance. However, it is not mimesis that interests me but
 the structure of distraction built into the text. The strong women-centered
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community in Jewett’s novel does not, finally, gain the attention so much as the
 
equation of that community with remoteness and renunciation, suggesting the
 ways in which the world of the writer has been defined as 
a
 distracted, absent ­
ed, male world, closer to that of the sailor than that of his wife. Reading past
 representation, we come upon the cognitive links of imaginative attention and
 witness the recasting of the world that renunciation brings to the fore. Like a
 lost vessel, drifting is a necessary prelude to the redefinition of one
'
s sense of  
direction. And there is no greater pleasure than the sense of floating above,
 transcending physical and intellectual confinement, and starting or becoming
 anew.
At one point in Willa Cather’s novel, My Ántonia, the narrator, Jim Bur
­
den, agrees to sleep where Ántonia Shimerda is house-sitting because she has
 become fearful of Wick Cutter, the man who owns the house. She fears for her
 physical safety. During the third night that Burden is sleeping in the Cutters’
 house, the man returns, ostensibly to rape Ántonia. “A hand closed softly on my shoulder,” Jim reports, “and at the same moment I felt something hairy and
 cologne-scented brushing my face.” When Cutter discovers Jim has replaced
 Ántonia, he 
is
 enraged and begins choking and beating Jim. After the beating,  
Jim runs back home and goes to sleep.
Grandmother found me there in the morning. Her cry of fright awakened
 
me. Truly, I was a battered object. As she helped me to my room, I caught
 a glimpse of myself in the mirror. My lip was cut
 
and stood out like a snout.  
My nose looked like a big blue plum, and one eye was swollen shut and
 hideously discolored. Grandmother said we must have the doctor at once,
 but I implored her, as I never begged for anything before, not to send for
 him. I could stand anything, I told her, so long as nobody saw me or knew
 what happened to me. (189)
As for Ántonia, Jim testifies that he “hated her almost as much as I hated Cut
­
ter. She had let me in for all this
 
disgustingness.” Properly explicated, this  
scene 
is
 read as a classic reversal of roles. Hence, we witness the education of  
Jim Burden, as he learns about what he calls the disgustingness of the aftermath
 of a rape — the quality of degenerated self-awareness that follows sexual
 assault. Jim is thoroughly feminized by the experience, even to the point of
 worrying “what the old men down at the drug-store” would say about it all.
To what extent can 
a
 man take the place of a woman, have her experiences,  
know the world as she knows it? These are not uncomplicated questions. My
 Ántonia 
is
 written from the perspective of Jim Burden, the male narrator and  
substitute rape victim. And although Jim takes Willa Cather’s place in this
 novel, critics have differed in their reactions to this literary device (see for
 instance Donovan; Fetterly; and Lambert). Can a woman write through the
 perspective of a male narrative voice, and if she does, is her male voice really a
 female voice masquerading as male? The issue 
is
 foregrounded in a brief intro ­
duction that forms part of the novel, where yet another narrator (frequently
 understood as Cather herself) claims to have received the manuscript of “My
 Ántonia” from Jim Burden. But Jim Burden is a fictional creation of Willa
13
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Cather, a product of her imagination. Readers encountering the novel for the
 
first time often wonder, 
is
 this really something that was given to Cather —  
that is, did she not write this herself? The question is a good one. The novel
 begs its readers to read past gender, past the facts of “herself,” and to pose the
 question: If I had that body, and that set of experiences, what would the world
 look like and feel like to me?
Jims response to his experience is heavily coded as female, as if he had been
 
made into a woman by the assault on his physical 
self.
 The formal strategy  
Cather employs in this novel, where the male narrative voice gives her the text,
 and the text is informed by his voice, and the voice in turn becomes Cather
'
s 
text, must be read past in order to be comprehended fully. If a man could take
 a
 
womans place, in the logic of the Burden/Cutter scene, if he could experience  
the world as she experiences it, he would act and react as she does. Further
­more, the “if” 
is
 easily removed from the previous statement  when the man (or  
the woman) 
is
 willing to suspend his sense of himself and enter into the expe ­
rience of another, imaginatively. Our experiences author us, in other words,
 including those experiences we have when we are inattentive to our daily lives.
 These speculations are enforced by Cather’s own effort in the novel to read past
 her female self and imagine, in the narrative, the male voice. The assault
 
on Jim  
is a restoration of the original reversal, where Cather becomes the male narra
­tor, and then the male narrator becomes the female victim.
The costs incurred in not attending to who we are may be psychically
 
severe. As Stanley Aronowitz reminds us, “loyalty to the nation-state, conven
­tionally tied to the meaning of citizenship itself, 
is
 shifted to subculture or gen ­
der, often taken as subculture” (62). Literary study in today’s classroom does,
 and always has done, the work of political culture, particularly
 
by the process of  
reading for recognition. Readers wish to see themselves — their sexuality, their
 race, their people — reflected in what they read; and, if possible, they prefer to
 see themselves as they would like to be: articulate, consequential, recognized.
 If the course of study is American literature and I am an American, I (or some
­one like me) ought to be recognizable on the syllabus. What Cather’s text does
 
is
 to question this method of reading. Who recognizes Jim Burden, the male  
or the female reader? The males will say, that’s not me because the female
 author cannot know my experiences, even if she calls her narrator “Jim.” The
 female reader will say, that’s not me because this particular female author must
 mask herself as “Jim” and I am not so masked. But once the literary mode of
 cognition abandons the ability to attend to matters outside its physical bound
­aries, it has little left that exceeds confession.
As we come to accept, with increasingly less reflection, the social equation
 
of reading and recognition, we lose sight of the fundamental value of the liter
­ary experience, which has only partially and pot always to do with recognition
 of one’s own nonliterary existence. I do not mean that literature must decenter
 us, or make the familiar strange, or expand our horizons, or make us more sen
­sitive to others — well, I mean all of these formalist things, of course, but also
 something more. My refrain: Literary study 
is
 the study of how one reads past.  
It is not the study of maleness, or the study of the female voice, or the study of
 any particularly decentered representation or estranged reception of reality but
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the study of how one reads past every one of these phenomena to the structures
 
of cognition that produce and sustain them. In My Ántonia, Willa Cather
 escaped the confines of gender as an unproblematic determinant of artistic pro
­duction — that is, she enveloped the voice of the male and spoke it back.
 Cather
'
s escape, no matter how we assess it, brings the pleasurable prospect of  
our own escape from confinement.
The most difficult thing for the human mind to envision is another mode
 
of thought, a mode of consciousness that will render its own thought processes
 obsolete. And yet, historically, we know that such paradigm shifts have
 occurred with epochal regularity. Today’s common sense evolves into the next
 eras idiocy, when what we accept as articulate expression is reinterpreted as
 bobbing, moaning, and slobbering. “Books that exceed our customary uses of
 language can teach us not just new facts — something
 
we did not already know  
— but new forms of life: something we did not necessarily know we wanted or
 needed to know (Carafiol 168). Peter Carafiol claims that such books “do not
 change the world. They are changes in the world that prompt changes in the
 reader.” My Ántonia is something of an intrusion, 
a
 work of fiction whose fic-  
tionality includes not only the circumstances of its emergence but the assaults
 it made upon the mind of its author. Reading past its narrative incidents and
 details brings us to a realm where experience and essence cross. The relation
 between Jim Burden and Willa Cather lies between the curling flower spaces of
 our imaginative capacities, within the ellipses of consciousness, in the spaces
 left out of the current configuration of human perception and articulation.
Dilsey says of the Compson landholdings, “We aint got the room we use to
 
have.” One must travel to far-off places, further than Dunnet Landing, for a
 psychic landscape that has room for Benjamin Compson. As a result, Dilsey
 says, Benjamin “cant stay out in the yard, crying where all the neighbors can see
 him” (60). The closing in of private space (or the expansion of the public,
 mediated community) and the increasingly insistent demands to pay attention,
 make Benjamins voice intrusive on others who don’t want to attend to its wail.
 The meaning of human speech changes with every shift in context, and what 
is a sympathetic plea in one set of circumstances becomes a pathetic annoyance in
 another. Rodney King asks, “Why can’t we just get along?” after his beating by
 Los Angeles police, and the utterance eventually becomes a trope for clueless
­ness on the comedy club and morning radio circuit. What Benjamin Compson
 says, what he has to say, is of no value to the neighbors, even if they
 
were to be  
told about all time and injustice and sorrow and all voiceless misery under the
 sun. The neighbors just don’t want to know about it, don’t want their inatten
­tion filled that way because, as we know, Benjy is pretty disgusting and the
 change in the world represented by his voice 
is
 not pleasant.
Literary texts, despite the private nature pf reading them, are public docu
­ments, and they inspire and inform public discourse. The detail of the Comp
­son neighbors not appreciating Benjamin’s wail signals an ethical issue to the
 reader: should Benjamin be hidden away? The guidebooks make it clear that
 at the very least, he must be explained away, so that the reader’s attention 
is
 not  
piqued to the point of exhaustion by the narrative’s formulaic uncertainty. The
 neighbors are well within their rights to demand a quiet neighborhood; cer-
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tainly, readers of the text will demand the same from their own neighbors. The
 
ethical issue has nothing to do with the neighbors, finally, but with Benjamin
 and his narrative. What is to be done with the man who is a completely aso
­cial, noncomprehending, inarticulate, compulsively needy sibling, whose words
 require that we read another book to make sense of them? Caddy hugs him but
 leaves him; Quentin gets him drunk; Dilsey feeds him; Jason has him castrated
 and committed. Each act, alone, and in certain combinations, represents a
 social option, and each act mirrors a critical intervention. However, in order
 truly to make room for Benjamin Compson, we need to resist every effort to
 rationalize his discourse. We must renounce every hug, drink, and incision
 available to us as readers; Benjamin cannot be absorbed, obliterated, or edited
 to suit the structure of thought we bring to bear on his textual existence.
Literary encounters provoke intellectual restructuring. Martha Nussbaum
 
has found literary texts useful on law school reading lists because “[literature
 focuses on the possible, inviting its readers to wonder about themselves” (5).
 Nussbaum 
is
 not thinking about subject matter so much as the more formal  
aspects of literary texts. “In their very mode of address to their imagined read
­
er,
 they convey the sense that there are links of possibility, at least on a very gen ­
eral level, between the characters and the reader.” As a result of these affinities,
 the reader's speculative imagination 
is
 piqued to envision alternative modes of  
being: what would it be like to be Benjamin Compson, and in what ways are
 we like him already? The imagination of alternatives 
is
 vital to the practice of  
law and to the health of a democracy in general,
 
which is why  Nussbaum brings  
literary texts to the preprofessional legal curriculum. “The reader
'
s emotions  
and imagination are very active as a result,” Nussbaum concludes, “and it is the
 nature of this activity, and its relevance for public thinking” that merit critical
 scrutiny. The capacity of literary study to lead the mind toward breaking
 through barriers of thinking, to make more space where it seems “we aint got
 the room,” is the pleasure of the well-flung harpoon, or the perfectly wrought
 earthenware jug.
Faulkner’s novel is difficult to read and requires sustained attention; or,
 
more accurately, it requires periodic inattention. The reader must interrupt
 reading the novel and consider what sort of sense to make of it. There comes
 a point where “we aint got the room” and we, as thinking subjects, must divert
 our attention from the spasmodic narrative. The Sound and the Fury seems
 aware of
 
the demands it makes on human attention because it structures dis ­
traction into its narrative. Consider the following passage, in which Quentin
 Compson 
is
 fighting (unsuccessfully) with his sister 's lover:
I hit him my open hand beat the impulse to shut it to his face his hand
 
moved as fast as mine the cigarette went over the rail I swung with the
 other hand he caught it too before the cigarette reached the water he held
 both my wrists in the same hand his other hand flicked to his armpit under
 his coat behind him the sun slanted and a bird singing somewhere beyond
 the sun we looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my
 hands loose (160)
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The bird evoked at the end of the passage signals a lack of room in Quentins
 
mind, and a need to think past his predicament. His sister Caddy is pregnant
 by this man, Dalton Ames, and Quentin wants to run him out of town because
 of it. However, Ames proves to be a considerate lover, asking about Caddy, and
 for all we know he has no interest in deserting her. Furthermore, Quentin is
 not up to the task of physically forcing the man to do anything, as seen in the
 passage above. At the point when Quentin 
is
 “caught” (with both wrists held  
in one of Ames’s hands) his mind departs from the immediate situation and he
 
is
 distracted by “a bird singing somewhere beyond the sun.” Hence, Quentin is  
not paying attention to his immediate business with Dalton Ames. With the
 bird in mind, Quentin has the potential to read past his predicament, realizing
 what he must do to survive, if not prevail, in this circumstance. And so “we
 looked at one another while the bird singing he turned my hands loose.”
 Quentin doesn’t quite make it, by the way — he soon assaults Ames again and
 is subdued, again gently, by the kind lover, who leaves quietly to save Quentin




I leaned on the rail looking at the water I heard him untie the horse and
 
ride off and after a while I couldn’t hear anything but the water and then
 the bird again I left the bridge and sat down with my back against the tree
 and shut my eyes a patch of sun came through and fell across my eyes and
 I moved a little further around the tree I heard the bird again and the water
 and then everything sort of rolled away and I didn
'
t feel anything at all I felt  
almost good . . . after a while I knew that he hadn
'
t hit me that he had lied  
about that for her sake too and that I had just passed out
 
like a girl but even  
that didn
'
t matter anymore (162; ellipsis added)
I would equate Quentin’s attention to the bird with the reader’s attention to lit
­
erature and with the potential for
 
public thinking held by literary studies. In a 
bind, such 
as
 finding out that the villain is no blackguard, or trying to fight and  
finding the opponent is not only more powerful than you but also does not con
­sider you an enemy and has no interest in fighting, the mind has some options.
 It can shut down in despair. It can go on fighting, insisting that the enemy
 become an enemy (at one point Ames offers Quentin a pistol), making the fight
 itself the point of contention, rather than the issue which gave rise to the con
­frontation. Or the mind can depart, read past its predicament to something
 else, another level of consciousness, through the fictional to a structure of con
­sciousness capable of transcendence. In short, it may decide not to pay atten
­tion for a while — to be distracted, that is, by its desire for pleasure even in the
 midst of turmoil, secure in the knowledge that distraction (“diversion of the
 mind, attention, etc., from 
a
 particular object or course”) may in fact be the  
solution.
The value of literary study is precisely in the function of reading past the
 
necessary and mechanical depictions of the real and providing room for readers
 to do the same. The solution to an intellectual problem is seldom located in the
 kind of thinking that produced the problem in the first place. Academic liter-
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ature programs maintain their place in higher education because, frankly, of
 
their irrelevance to the research and teaching objectives of preprofessional cur
­ricula. Like Quentin’s bird, literary studies are there for the attention of those
 who realize, finally, that the human mind is nurtured very much by what it does
 not need to know. Reading past Tie Sound and the Fury, we find that when
 faced with an incontrovertible fact, a barrier, an unresolvable problem, the
 answer is to look elsewhere, past the immediate toward the irrelevant — per
­haps to engage another sense, another source of pleasure. Literature distracts;
 it directs our attention elsewhere, as a release from the confinements of yester
­day’s insight, the hands of Dalton Ames, the body of Ántonia Shimerda. From
 such constraints we crave the pleasures of distraction, to be “physically or men
­tally drawn in different directions by conflicting forces or emotions,” to enter
 the realm between the curling flower spaces of our expectations.
Then again, there 
is
 some danger in this process. Quentin Compson, who  
hears the song of the invisible bird, goes to Harvard, where he ultimately com
­mits suicide. Is literary studies a parlor game, or do we face danger when we
 ask minds to read past their predicament? In Sanctuary, Faulkner juxtaposes
 the killer’s gun and reader’s book in the novel’s opening scene, where a man





was about four oclock on an afternoon in May. They squatted so, fac ­
ing one another across the spring, for two hours. Now and then the bird
 sang back in the swamp, 
as
 though it were worked by a clock; twice more  
invisible automobiles passed along the highroad and died away. Again the
 bird sang. (5)




each from four until six p.m. The reader is quite likely to ignore it. How ­
ever, if we read
 
past the duration, we have two unlikely details juxtaposed. First,  
there is the two-hour encounter. But the second and even less credible repre
­sented fact is that the one man’s gun is checked, or held in abeyance, by the
 other man’s book. The incomprehensible nature of the encounter amounts to
 an overloaded set of stimuli — there isn’t room in the mind to make sense of it
 — and rather than attend to the encounter, we attend to the sound of the bird,
 and note its clockishness. The province of literature is in the bird’s song, and
 when we read, in attentive inattention, it 
is
 always a face-off, while the bird  
singing, within someone else's powers of cognition. The particulars of repre
­sentation, whether of Dunnet Landing or Yoknapatawpha County, are sec
­ondary and often irrelevant to the processes of creation and escape embedded
 in the modes of attention demanded by the text. In any case, it is always the
 book versus the gun, the lure of distraction in a standoff against those stimuli
 that demand our attention.
The result of attending to the song of this bird may lead to deaths of all
 
kinds — the death of certain ways of thinking, the death of solidly held con
­victions, the death of impassable thoughts — not all of which are, by progres
­sive standards, bad things. Like a bird sent into 
a
 mineshaft, we look to it as a  
harbinger of survival. However, there are no guarantees. Literary studies has
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no programmatic mission outside of making room in the mind. Hence, liter
­
ary politics are always chaotic, unsystematic, and volatile, while literary study
 — the experience of making room in the mind — brings pleasure to those who
 can read its language. It feels good to clear space, to engage those senses dulled
 by attentiveness, to engage in studied distraction. However, once room is made,
 what moves in is not predictable. Reading literary texts makes the mind vul
­nerable to potential assault as well as to potential liberation. Unkind words may
 and often do result from literary employments. Once we have imagined our
­selves as someone else, as Jim Burden perhaps, or once we have let someone or
 something else control our cognitive processes, we may find our moorings
 revealed as whale lines, linked to monstrosities. A simple gesture, innocent as
 the bird’s song, is thus revealed in the reading
 
of it as participating in something  
demonic, in the destruction of worlds. Quentin, at Harvard, managed to read
 past his sense of himself as brother, to lover, and then to victim; he then, as
 Quentin, ceased to exist. “So we die before our own eyes,” Jewett’s narrator
 says, 
as
 she leaves Dunnet Landing; “so we see some chapters of our lives come  
to their natural end” (100). Reading literature 
is
 always a judgment on the real.  
To choose the novel over the newspaper, over the book of nonfiction, or over
 the television (which, even if fantasy, is punctuated regularly with commercial
 calls to attention), is to say No to the actual and Yes (as it were) to the bird’s
 song, beyond the sun. So we choose to die before our own eyes. But even if
 nature will not suffice, our most durable myths tell us that from death comes
 new life.
The habit of reading past can be taught, but only if literary pedagogy
 
remains distinct from most other forms of teaching, forms that rely upon the
 importation of knowledge, and upon making clear what is to be known. Liter
­ary
 
study is often sabotaged by instructional methods that call upon students to  
read texts as sociological or psychological cases, or 
as
 formalist or linguistic  
puzzles. These methods barely read, let alone read past, their texts. As profes
­sors of literature, we would serve our interests better if we claimed to teach
 methods of distraction. The feeling of Friday afternoon to the nine-to-five
 worker, the anticipation of the bell to the public school child, the embrace of
 the infant after the absence of the parent, the lover’s eyes across crowded pub
­lic spaces: these are the pleasures of welcomed distraction, promising escape
 from here and access to another level of existence, where muted senses are
 brought back to life. The purpose of literary study is to make room in the mind
 now for such pleasures of renewal, so that it can read past what it knows, or 
is expected to know, and migrate to other cognitive structures of knowledge.
The title character of Bharati Mukherjee’s 1989 novel, Jasmine, narrates a
 
tale of immigration to the United States from India. Jasmine arrives in Flori
­da and is raped by a degenerate figure called Half-Face, whom she kills. She
 then flees to New York, becomes an au pair (and falls in love with Taylor, the
 father in the family for whom she works), and finally moves again to Iowa,
 where she lives with a paraplegic man named Bud. The novel culminates, on
 its last page, in a scene where Taylor reappears with his daughter to take Jas
­mine to California. This is the novel’s final paragraph:
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Then there is nothing I can do. Time will tell if I am a tornado, rubble
­
maker, arising from nowhere and disappearing into a cloud. I am out the
 door and in the potholed and rutted driveway, scrambling ahead of Taylor,
 greedy with wants and reckless from hope.
By its placement in the text, it would seem that the conclusion to the novel is
 
Jasmines decision to move again, to leave Bud for Taylor. The novel, however,
 is not written in a linear fashion. Instead, its narrative proceeds kaleidoscopi-
 cally, with scenes from India, Florida, New York, and Iowa interspersed, mak
­ing a text that is “pitted, pocked, and broken up,” according to its epigraph.
 Furthermore, at the end of the first chapter, the narrator explains, "I am twen
­ty-four now, and I live in Baden County, Iowa” (3), 
as
 if the novel were about  
to unfold from this particular perspective. However, if Jasmine 
is
 twenty-four  
and in Iowa “now,” at the novel’s writing, then where exactly
 is
 the “now” of the  
text’s conclusion? The last paragraph casts her "out the door” and “scrambling
 ahead of Taylor,” off to a place that will not be Baden, Iowa. Hence, what fol
­lows Iowa 
is
 the only perspective from which the entire novel, including the  
conclusion, can be written. Otherwise, the “now” of the first chapter must be
 ignored.




s novel cogitates on what it ever means to say, “I am this old now  
and I live here.” The text thus echoes Cather
'
s Southwest Native American  
women, whose now was filled with geometrical expressions of the aesthetics of
 their duties as pot bearers. Jasmine
'
s sense of now overflows with greedy wants  
and reckless hopes. Like Platos concept of becoming, the now of Mukherjee’s
 novel is eternally and defiantly emergent, and “there 
is
 nothing [anyone] can  
do” about it. To Mukherjee, one answer to the question, “why are we here now”
 (living here; toting here; whaling here; listening to the bird
'
s song here) is 
always, “so we do not have to be here now.” The pleasure of escape is eternal
­ly on the tip of human consciousness, and always the subject matter of literary
 expression, for those who can read its language.
Literary modes of thought expand commonsense notions of the now, and
 
extend the content of now as cognitive space. The now of reading is always
 elsewhere, else-when, distracted. If, in Jasmine, time will tell what the final
 paragraph means, then the paragraph defies mimetic significance, as there 
is
 no  
time past the ending of any novel. The narrator says, “I am twenty-four now,
 and I live in Baden, Iowa,” and the novel ends with the narrator no longer liv
­ing there. Hence, the entire novel consists of a geometrically, or spatially
 extended now, as if a moment of intense decision can encompass a
 
lifetime. Jas ­
mine s decision to abandon Bud (made even more pivotal by the fact she 
is pregnant) is charted and prefigured by twenty-four years of abandonment,
 reversal, and trauma. Reading past any moral or ethical reading of Jasmine’s
 decision to leave the father of her unborn child (as if a fictional character could
 exercise judgment worthy of anyone’s contemplation), Jasmine enriches our
 sense of what we mean by now whenever we consider its meaning. Far from
 being emptied, far from a blip between one’s sense of the future and one’s past,
 between desire and memory, Mukherjee’s now 
is
 spatially resonant, “greedy  
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with wants and reckless from hope.” A major decision 
is
 thus explained neither  
ethically nor morally 
(as
 in, "one does not desert ones lover”) but geometrical ­
ly, by placing the cognitive process on a chart of personal experiences — expe
­riences which are always possessed as the defining characteristics of one
'
s sense  
of now.
Literary critics use the present tense when they discuss texts, because liter
­
ary enactment always exists in the present, in the now. Benjamin Compson
 moans and slobbers eternally, and holds the jimson weed for comfort. In the
 now, with Jasmine, are Benjamin Compson, Jim Burden and Ántonia Shimer-
 da, the
 
whale line, Dunnet  Landing, Quentin 's bird, Popeye’s gun, and the curl ­
ing flower spaces. In a prolonged and extensive now
 is
 where literary texts place  
the minds of those who can read their language, not in the name of attending to
 the present, but with the purpose of exploring underneath, beyond, and past it.
 And
 
what else is pleasure, but a heightened sense of one 's existence, in the now?  
Drugs and alcohol, for centuries, have aided human beings in their quest to
 expand experience — and specific narcotics have influenced more than one lit
­erary movement in history. Sexual pleasures awaken bodily sensations, held in
 check by a cerebral civilization whose purposes are complicated by physicality.
 Such distractions cannot be incorporated by demands for attention — don’t
 drink and drive, and don’t read and drive — but neither can the pleasures they
 represent be expunged from human impulses. Literary study cannot abandon
 the pleasures of inattention without abdicating its essence 
as
 a tradition — not  
as a canon but as a mode of thought. For once we read past historical fiction,
 science fiction, comedy, tragedy, romanticism, and the rest, the single, universal
 object of literary study is the present in all its limitlessness and expansion. Any
­thing less trivializes our lives as literary scholars and trivializes the purpose of
 literary study. Above all else, we read literature to extend the present, to fill the
 now 
as
 fully as possible, paying no attention to the tendency of human institu ­
tions to trivialize the now by insisting that memory or management define it
 essentially. In the literary now, between the curling flower spaces, time will
 always tell what
 
it  is we get when we make room for the greedy wants and reck ­
less desires of literary employments. This is what feels right, feels good.
First comes Benjamin Compson, in other words, full of sound and fury, and
 
then comes puzzled attention, as when Caddy comes running with her book
­satchel and listens to what Benjy has to say. The strength of such literary
 encounters has always resided, ultimately, in the mode of thought resurrected
 on the page.
“Did you come to meet Caddy.” she said, rubbing my hands. “What 
is 
it. What are you trying to tell Caddy.” Caddy smelled like trees and like
 when she says we were asleep.
What are you moaning about, Luster said. You can watch them again when
 
we get back to the branch. Here. Here's you a jimson weed. He gave me the
 flower. We went through the fence, into the lot. (6)
What do we want to say, what do we moan about, when we become so dis
­
tracted we read past the page? Literary recognition is not a matter of mirrored
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reflection but an abrupt encounter with something we thought we had lost,
 
some way of thinking possessed by someone else, in another place, at some
 other time. In the text something survives, coarse and poisonous, like the jim-
 son weed, or playfully welcomed, like the jouncing booksatchel, dogging us
 through the fence and into the realm of public thinking. When we accustom
 our minds to the patterns on the earthenware pots, we find ourselves reading
 past the function of the jars, escaping into the realm of what tugs at the lines,
 and, while the bird singing, finding what provides when we become heedless,




Among the examples: Hahn and Kinney; Ross and Polk; Matthews;  
Polk; Bloom; Kinney; Bleikasten; Meriwether; and Cowan.
2.
 
This has become a problem in the workplace. See, for example, Breuer.  
It is also an issue with the growing move to allow employees to work at home.
 See Roha.
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